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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
Earl M. Jones, III*
Eduardo F. Cuaderes Jr.**
Jennifer A. Youpa***
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexpected, state and federal courts have struggled with the Su-
preme Court's Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.1 de-
cision. The Fifth Circuit, in particular, has issued inconsistent
opinions, with some panels holding that Reeves overrules certain prece-
dent while others assert that it is business as usual. Statutory discrimina-
tion cases focusing on whether a plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence
to take a case to the jury or to sustain the jury's findings dominate this
year's Survey.
The cases discussed in this article, which is not intended to be an ex-
haustive survey of all employment or labor law cases, highlight issues of





The United States Supreme Court settled a split among the circuit
courts regarding whether front pay should be included in Title VII's
$300,000 compensatory damage cap. In Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co.,2 the plaintiff won at trial on a Title VII sexual harass-
ment claim, and the district court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory
damages plus over $100,000 in front pay. The Sixth Circuit reduced the
total award to $300,000, interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)'s damage
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1. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
2. 532 U.S. 843 (2001).
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cap to require the inclusion of front pay awards in the total amount of
compensatory damages ($300,000) that may be awarded. The Supreme
Court reversed, noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which author-
ized for the first time the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
under Title VII, expressly stated that compensatory damages were in ad-
dition to any remedies previously available to an aggrieved party. The
court concluded that front pay was a remedy available before the 1991
amendments to Title VII and, therefore, was not to be included within
the $300,000 cap.
b. Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
The most important Texas Supreme Court decision during the Survey
period was Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Toennies.3 In Quantum Chemi-
cal, the court clarified when evidence may be sufficient 1) to create a fact
issue and 2) to sustain a jury finding of discrimination under the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act.4 Ralf Toennies worked for Quantum
Chemical as an engineer. A few months after he began to report to a new
supervisor, his performance reviews changed from being satisfactory to
"below expectations." After Quantum fired Toennies for poor perform-
ance, Toennies sued Quantum, alleging that he was the victim of age dis-
crimination. At trial (where the jury found no discrimination), Toennies
did not introduce any direct evidence of age discrimination. Instead, he
attempted to prove discrimination by establishing that the employer's
reason for his termination-poor performance-was false or a pretext for
discrimination. Some of the co-workers called to testify at trial stated
that Toennies was "diligent" and "very competent." The Texas Supreme
Court held that this testimony and his prior satisfactory performance ap-
praisals, which contradicted the employer's explanation that Toennies
was a poor performer, were sufficient to "permit the trier of fact to find
that the employer was actually motivated by discrimination."' 5 The court
remanded the case for another trial with a new set of jury instructions to
assess whether the employer's decision was motivated by Toennies' age.6
The Quantum Chemical decision is significant because it suggests that
employment decisions based on subjective evaluations will be a fact-in-
tensive inquiry resulting in more cases going to the jury.
In addition, while Texas state courts normally follow authority devel-
oped under Title VII, the Quantum Chemical court held that the text of
the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act was different than Title VII
in two respects. First, the Texas legislature chose the "motivating factor"
test and included it specifically in the statute. 7 Second, the Texas legisla-
ture (unlike the United States Congress) also made what has been known
3. 47 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 2000).
4. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.556 (Vernon 2002).
5. Id. at 481-82.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 473.
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as the "mixed-motive" defense available in any discrimination case. 8 As
a result, a defendant-employer may raise as an affirmative defense the
contention that the adverse employment action would have occurred re-
gardless of the plaintiff-employee's protected status. In those situations,
the remedies available to the plaintiff are substantially reduced.
c. Class Actions
The Fifth Circuit continues to disfavor employment discrimination
class-action cases. In Smith v. Texaco, Inc.,9 the Eastern District of Texas
certified a race discrimination class alleging discrimination in promotions,
compensation and benefits, and in the creation of a hostile work environ-
ment. The plaintiffs contended that the employer's evaluation, job post-
ing, and promotion policies were subjective, allowing the employer to
apply facially neutral practices in a discriminatory manner. Because the
class sought compensatory damages, the court held that these individual
claims predominated the claims for class injunctive relief.10 In addition,
the plaintiff-class also sought punitive damages. Because the evidence
required to establish punitive damages requires "individualized indepen-
dent proof," the individual nature of the claims overwhelmed the com-
mon issues of the class. 1' As a result, class certification was deemed
inappropriate.
d. Filing of Charges of Discrimination
The law surrounding the filing of charges of discrimination and the
working relationship between the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") and the Texas Commission on Human Rights contin-
ues to develop. The Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Grinnell Corp.,12 vacated a
judgment for the plaintiff because the plaintiff attempted to rely on an
EEOC right-to-sue letter to provide the court with jurisdiction in a case
arising under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
("TCHRA"). 13 The court determined that an EEOC right-to-sue letter is
not interchangeable with a TCHRA letter.14
Similarly, in Luna v. Walgreen Co.,15 a charge of discrimination filed
with the EEOC was not filed with or provided to the Texas Commission
on Human Rights. After receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter, the
plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court alleging TCHRA discrimination.
The employer removed the case to federal court based on diversity.' 6 Be-
cause the EEOC did not provide the charge of discrimination to the
8. Id.
9. 263 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001).
10. Id. at 403-12.
11. See id. at 411.
12. 235 F.3d 972 (5th Cir. 2001).
13. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.556.
14. Grinnell Corp., 235 F.3d at 975.
15. No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-224E-R, 2001 WL 1142806 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2001).
16. Id. at *3.
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Texas Commission on Human Rights, the court concluded that it had no
jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment under
the TCHRA.17 The Jones precedent barred the court "from hearing the
case regardless of equitable and policy concerns." 18
e. Attorneys' Fees
The risk of practicing employment law was the issue in Dodge v. Hunt
Petroleum Corp.19 The jury awarded Dodge approximately $3,200 in a
retaliation case under the TCHRA.20 Dodge then sought over $145,000
in attorney's fees as the prevailing party. The defendant contended that
the fee request was grossly excessive because the fees requested included
claims that were not a part of the federal court litigation, related to exten-
sions of time required due to plaintiff's counsels' failure to meet certain
deadlines, and plaintiff's limited success at trial.21 The court proceeded
to apply the twelve factors for attorney fee recovery set out in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.22 Since the plaintiff was unsuccessful in
her gender discrimination claim, the court, despite the factual overlap be-
tween the claims, substantially reduced the fee request by seventy-five
percent. 23 The court determined that a fee award of $36,651 was a rea-
sonable amount even though the plaintiff only recovered approximately
$3,600.24 The court also said the $36,000 fee award was reasonable in
light of the defendant's role in the contentious nature of discovery.25
2. Stray Remarks
The Fifth Circuit has not reached a consensus on how to apply or inter-
pret Reeves. In several cases during the Survey Period, the Fifth Circuit
had the opportunity to clarify for employment law practitioners the quan-
tum of proof required to establish pretext; instead, the cases reveal that
the court is struggling with the type of evidence which will sustain a find-
ing of impermissible discrimination-particularly stray remarks.
Prior to Reeves, the seminal Fifth Circuit stray remarks case was Brown
v. CSC Logic, Inc.26 In CSC Logic, the court established a four-part test
to determine whether a particular comment is an irrelevant and inadmis-
sible stray remark or whether the comment is a probative and admissible
indication of discriminatory animus or motive.27 To be evidence of dis-
crimination, under CSC Logic, the remark must be: (1) related to the
protected class; (2) proximate in time to the decision; (3) made by one
17. See id.; see also Jones v. Grinnell Corp., 235 F.3d 972, 974-75 (5th Cir. 2001).
18. Luna, 2001 WL 1142806, at *4.
19. 174 F. Supp. 2d 505 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
20. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.556.
21. Dodge, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
22. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
23. Id. at 510.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 511.
26. 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996).
27. See id.
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with authority over the decision; and (4) related to the employment deci-
sion at issue.28 In Reeves, however, the Supreme Court articulated an-
other test: whether the content of the comment indicates invidious
animus and whether someone "principally responsible" made the
comment.2
9
After Reeves, the Fifth Circuit's first opportunity to analyze its stray
remark's doctrine was in Rubinstein v. Administrators of Tulane Educa-
tion Fund.30 In Rubinstein, the court held that Reeves did not overrule its
stray remarks doctrine.31 A few months later, another Fifth Circuit
panel, in Russell v. McKinnney Hosp. Venture,32 concluded that Reeves
overruled CSC Logic's four-part test. A week later, another panel, in
Evans v. City of Bishop,33 noted that Reeves "cast doubt" on the prior
stray remarks doctrine. Despite Russell and Evans, the Fifth Circuit con-
tinued to apply the CSC Logic test in Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co. 34 and
Auguster v. Vermilion Parish School Board.35
One issue is whether any distinction between the "Reeves principally
responsible" test and the CSC Logic four-part test is merely one of se-
mantics. Certainly, the "principally responsible" test does not on its face
require the comment to be related to the employment decision at issue
although the "content" of the comment must be assessed. In Evans v.
City of Bishop, for example, the court reversed a summary judgment be-
cause, in part, Reeves "emphatically states that requiring evidence to be
'in the direct context' of the employment decision is incorrect. '36 None-
theless, one could argue that the two approaches when applied to the
same set of facts will lead to the same result. For example, in Russell, the
court following Reeves held that referring to the plaintiff as an "old bitch"
was potential evidence that a jury should consider in deciding whether
the plaintiff was discriminated against because of her age. 37 In Medina,
where the court applied the CSC Logic standard, a supervisor's comment
that the company "get rid of all the old people" without directing the
comment to or about the plaintiff, was admissible.38 In Russell, the Me-
dina court held that the comment was probative evidence because the
inference to be drawn from the comment was for the jury, not the court.39
Under either standard, when a comment is direct and suggests illegal ani-
mus or motive, the Fifth Circuit will likely hold that the comment creates
a fact issue.
28. Id. at 655.
29. Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 145 (2001)).
30. 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000).
31. Id.
32. 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2000).
33. 238 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2000).
34. 238 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2001).
35. 249 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001).
36. 238 F.3d at 591.
37. Russell, 235 F.3d at 226.




On the flip side, the Fifth Circuit has affirmed summary judgments us-
ing both standards. In Auguster, the court, applying the CSC Logic test,
held that an alleged comment by a decisionmaker one year earlier-
standing alone-did not establish pretext.40 Similarly, in Rios, the court
found that the plaintiff's evidence of "many disparaging and racially in-
sensitive remarks made by... managers and supervisors" did not create a
fact issue under the Reeves "principally responsible" test.41
The Supreme Court of Texas has not been as two-faced on the issue of
stray remarks. In M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute v. Wil-
lrich,42 the court adopted by reference the Fifth Circuit's pre-Reeves case
law to analyze whether stray remarks are admissible in discrimination
cases under the TCHRA. 43
3. Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment
How to pigeon-hole acts of sexual harassment into appropriate classifi-
cations for analysis was demonstrated in Lamb v. City of West University
Place.an In Lamb, the court had to classify certain conduct into either
hostile environment (environmental harassment) or quid pro quo (eco-
nomic harassment) categories. 45 The plaintiff contended that she was
sexually harassed and retaliated against by her supervisor, a police ser-
geant. Before becoming a sergeant, Police Officer Michael Peterson, ac-
cording to the plaintiff, began asking personal questions and suggesting
that they rendezvous after work. The plaintiff claims that she ignored
these advances. A few months later, the city promoted Peterson to the
sergeant position, and he became the plaintiff's direct supervisor. The
plaintiff contends that Peterson continued to act in a "sexually sugges-
tive" way towards her over the next year.4 6 After Peterson became the
plaintiff's direct supervisor, the plaintiff's performance reviews became
unsatisfactory-indicating problems of tardiness and of excessive, non-
work-related socializing on the clock. The poor performance reviews pre-
vented the plaintiff from receiving a merit-based pay increase. Unhappy
with these events, the plaintiff complained to the Chief of Police that Pe-
terson had been sexually harassing her and retaliating against her for re-
jecting his advances. One of the incidents that Lamb raised with the
Chief of Police had occurred more that a year earlier. After an investiga-
tion, the city disciplined Peterson with written and verbal reprimands and
directed him to cease the inappropriate behavior immediately. 47
About six months later, the plaintiff found a lewd fax, which Peterson
40. Auguster, 249 F.3d at 404.
41. Rios, 252 F.3d at 379.
42. 28 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2000).
43. 28 S.W.3d at 25.
44. 172 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex 2000).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 828.
47. Id.
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had sent as a joke to another police dispatcher.4 8 The city again promptly
investigated and disciplined Peterson by suspending him without pay. In
addition, Peterson apologized to Lamb in writing and verbally. Dis-
turbed by what she had found, the plaintiff sent a formal grievance to the
City Manager complaining of sexual harassment and that Peterson had
not been adequately disciplined. In response, the city appointed an
outside investigator to look into the allegations. After a lengthy investi-
gation, the city concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered retaliation
because she had not been treated more harshly than her co-workers. 49
The plaintiff then resigned and sued the city.
The court first analyzed the plaintiff's sexual harassment claims "on the
EllerthFaragher Road Map" by classifying various events into the envi-
ronmental and economic harassment categories. 50 The court determined
that receiving a bad performance evaluation, which resulted in her failure
to receive a merit-based pay raise, fell into the economic harassment cate-
gory.51 The court, however, rejected that theory of recover because the
plaintiff had not filed an EEOC charge within 300 days after receiving the
negative performance review.52 The court also rejected the plaintiff's at-
tempt to assert the "continuing violation theory" because the perform-
ance review was a discrete act.53
The plaintiff relied on three aspects of Peterson's conduct to support
her hostile environment theory: (1) Peterson's asking personal questions
while standing too close to her and using a suggestive tone; (2) Peter-
son's inappropriate references to the male anatomy; and (3) Peterson's
fax that the plaintiff had found near her desk.54 The court first deter-
mined that after the plaintiff complained, there was no evidence that any
other incidents of sexual harassment occurred.55 Further, the court classi-
fied Peterson's conduct as "general flirtatious behavior" and "two specific
conducts over the course of two and half years" that simply did not rise to
the level of actionable sexual harassment. 56 The court also determined
that the City had taken prompt and aggressive action when responding to
the plaintiff's complaints of harassment. 57 Accordingly, the court dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment.58
The court then analyzed the plaintiff's constructive discharge claim.59
In order to prevail on the constructive discharge claim, the court held that
48. Id.
49. See Lamb, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
50. See id. at 831; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
51. See Lamb, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 832-33.
54. Id. at 832-37.
55. See Lamb, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 832-37.
56. Id. at 834.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 837.
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the plaintiff must demonstrate "a greater severity or pervasiveness of har-
assment than the minimum required to prove a hostile work environ-
ment."'60 Because the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the city
subjected her to a hostile environment, her constructive discharge claim
failed as a matter of law.61
At issue in Perez v. MCI World Corn Communications62 was whether
harassment was based on sex or some other characteristic. In Perez, the
plaintiff began a consensual relationship with a co-worker. After the re-
lationship soured, the former boyfriend began to stalk the plaintiff, con-
stantly calling her, and later breaking into her home to destroy her
antique furniture. The plaintiff contended that the former boyfriend's
conduct interfered with her ability to perform her job, which led to re-
peated warnings and reprimands by the employer and eventual
termination. 63
As to the claim of sexual harassment, the employer contended that the
conduct was not based on the plaintiff's sex but, instead, was based on
personal animosity between plaintiff and her ex-boyfriend.64 The court
granted summary judgment and rejected the plaintiff's attempt to "label
sex-neutral harassment or discrimination as 'sex discrimination' or 'sexual
harassment' merely because it followed the break up of a consensual rela-
tionship between a man and a woman. '"65
In Adams v. Cal-Ark International, Inc.,66 the plaintiff was a truck
driver alleging claims of a sexually hostile work environment, retaliation,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant's motion
for summary judgment contended that the plaintiff had not filed a timely
charge of discrimination. 67 The court first noted that the EEOC filing
requirement is not a jurisdiction prerequisite, but instead is a statute of
limitations defense that is subject to the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and
equitable tolling.68 The interesting fact in this case is that the alleged
discriminatory employment practices occurred in Arkansas and Texas.
Arkansas is a non-deferral state, which requires that charges of discrimi-
nation be filed within 180 days of the date of the unlawful employment
action. Texas, on the other hand, is a deferral state, and a claimant must
file a charge of discrimination within 300 days from the date of the al-
leged discriminatory act.
The plaintiff originally filed her charge of discrimination with the
Houston, Texas, office of the EEOC, which referred her charge to the
60. Lamb, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (quoting Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d
191, 195 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 429 (5th
Cir. 1992), affd 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
61. Lamb, 172 F. Supp. at 837.
62. 154 F. Supp. 2d 932 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
63. Id. at 935.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 941.
66. 159 F. Supp. 2d 402 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
67. Id. at 405.
68. Id.
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Little Rock, Arkansas, office, where the employer was located. 69 The de-
fendant contended that the plaintiff should have filed her charge with the
Little Rock EEOC office within 180 days. Consequently, the defendant
argued that the plaintiff's filing was untimely. The court determined that
the plaintiff had shown that discriminatory acts had occurred in Arkansas
and Texas and that her charge of discrimination included unlawful em-
ployment practices within the appropriate time periods in Arkansas and
Texas.70
Statistical evidence was the key issue in Siler-Khodr v. The University
of Texas Health Science Center San Antonio.71 In Silor-Khodr, the plain-
tiff, a female professor, alleged that the university discriminated against
her because of her sex. The jury believed her and awarded her back pay
in the amount of $91,000 and compensatory damages of $20,000.72 At
trial, the plaintiff relied on statistical studies purporting to establish that
her unequal pay was due to her gender. On appeal, the employer alleged
that the statistical evidence could not support the jury's verdict because
of various infirmities of the studies. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and af-
firmed the trial court's judgment. 73
Being treated less favorably, without evidence that the conduct is based
on sex, will be fatal to a claim of sex discrimination. In Centex Corp. v.
Callaway,74 the jury awarded the plaintiff $987,500 in a sex discrimination
case. The plaintiff worked as a paralegal for the employer's legal depart-
ment. Because the employer reorganized its legal department, it decided
to eliminate the plaintiff's position while she was out on a medical leave
of absence. 75 The court reviewed all of the evidence to which the plaintiff
pointed in support of the finding of sex discrimination. The court, how-
ever, found that there was no evidence that she was treated differently
from the male attorneys or that she was subjected to certain events that
others were not, regardless of their gender.76 For example, she relied on
evidence that her supervisor treated her harshly, but at trial the testimony
demonstrated that her supervisor did not treat male attorneys any differ-
ently. She also testified that on a business trip her supervisor rode in first
class while she had to ride in coach, but the evidence at trial showed that
the supervisor had used his personal frequent flier mileage and finances
to upgrade his seat. In summary, the court found that all of the evidence
upon which the plaintiff relied did not establish acts of sex discrimination.
Because there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that the em-
ployment decision was motivated by sex, the court of appeals reversed
69. Id. at 402.
70. Id. at 407-08.
71. 261 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001).
72. Id. at 545.
73. Id. at 545-51.
74. No. 05-98-01308-01, 2001 WL 869584 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 2, 2001, pet. de-
nied) (not designated for publication).
75. Id. at *2-3.
76. Id. at *24.
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and rendered a judgment in the favor of the employer. 77
In Nardini v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,78 a female flight attendant was
allegedly accosted by a pilot in a hotel room after the entire crew had
dinner and drinks. The pilot had invited the flight attendant to his hotel
room, and the flight attendant agreed to join him. Once she entered the
room, she testified that the pilot attempted to have sex with her.
The employer filed a motion for summary judgment contending that
flight attendant hadno viable claim of sex harassment because the inci-
dent had occurred outside the workplace. 79 The court held that summary
judgment was proper because the pilot exercised no supervisory authority
over the plaintiff and the conduct that occurred in the hotel, during the
layover, represented voluntary conduct that did not relate to carrying out
her assigned work duties or responsibilities. 80
In Williams v. Vought,81 a husband and wife, both employees of the
employer, filed suit alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Additionally, the wife alleged sexual harassment. At trial, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the employer. 82
The wife alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed her by making
unwelcome sexual advances and engaging in other offensive verbal and
physical conduct. 83 She complained to other supervisors, and the com-
pany initiated an investigation. After the investigation, the employer
placed the wife's supervisor on a two-week, unpaid disciplinary suspen-
sion. The wife also took a leave of absence based on the direction of her
psychiatrist who diagnosed her with major depressive disorder. She then
filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC complaining that she had
been sexually harassed. After her leave of absence, the wife returned to
work and was given a different job assignment working for a different
supervisor. She alleged, however, that the harasser continued to "stalk"
her on the job. The plaintiff then filed another charge of discrimination
with the EEOC based on the alleged harassment. One issue on appeal
was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment preclud-
ing the wife from asserting sexual harassment claims based on the first
charge of discrimination.84
The employer contended that because the plaintiff had received a right
to sue letter from the EEOC in connection with the first charge and had
not brought a lawsuit within ninety days after receiving the right to sue
letter, she could not assert any claims of sexual harassment in connection
with the first charge of discrimination. 85 On appeal, the court decided
77. Id.
78. 60 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
79. Id. at 201.
80. Id.
81. 68 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
82. Id. at 107.
83. Id. at 106.
84. Id. at 106-07.
85. Id. at 107.
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that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment because the
plaintiff had never received a right to sue letter from the Texas Commis-
sion on Human Rights.86 Consequently, she was entitled to assert claims
under the TCHRA even though the EEOC had previously sent her a
right-to-sue letter. As a result, the court remanded the wife's claim for
sexual harassment in connection with her first charge of discrimination,
but affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects.8 7
4. Disability Discrimination
The disability case that drew the most attention during the Survey Pe-
riod was not an employment case but a public accommodation dispute.
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,88 a professional golfer sought a reasonable
accommodation to allow him to compete in professional golf tourna-
ments. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the Americans with
Disabilities Act required the PGA Tour to accommodate a professional
golfer's disability by providing him with a golf cart. The Court deter-
mined that the use of a cart would not "fundamentally alter the nature"
of professional golf and ordered the PGA Tour to provide the accommo-
dation.89 In addition, the Court found that the PGA Tour had failed to
comply with the ADA's requirement to conduct an individualized inquiry
in assessing the golfer's request for accommodation. 90
The Fifth Circuit followed a trend in recognizing hostile environment
claims based on protected categories other than sex. In Flowers v. South-
ern Regional Physician Services,91 the issue was whether the ADA pro-
hibited a hostile work environment based on disability. The plaintiff
alleged that once her employer learned of her HIV status, her supervisor
cut off social contact, intercepted and listened to phone calls, and forced
her to take more drug tests. The Fifth Circuit recognized the theory of
recovery as viable and affirmed the district court's judgment for the
plaintiff.92
This Survey period, the Fifth Circuit also reaffirmed that filing for so-
cial security benefits does not judicially estop a plaintiff from pursuing an
ADA complaint, despite inconsistent statements concerning the plaintiff's
ability to work. In Giles v. General Electric Co.,93 the court determined
that the plaintiff's explanation of prior inconsistent statements created a
fact issue as to whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disa-
bility under the ADA and upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
In contrast to Giles, the Fifth Circuit held in Holtzclaw v. DSC Com-
86. Id. at 111.
87. Williams, 68 S.W.3d at 117.
88. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
89. Id. at 683.
90. Id. at 689-90.
91. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
92. Id. at 232-39.
93. 245 F.3d 474, 481 (5th Cir. 2001).
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munications Corp.,94 that summary judgment is appropriate when the
plaintiff does not or can not explain inconsistent statements. "An ADA
plaintiff who, in an application for disability benefits, asserts that he is
unable to work must produce 'an explanation of this apparent inconsis-
tency' that is 'sufficient' to defeat summary judgment on the issue of
whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability." 95 Because
the plaintiff in this case failed to offer such evidence, the employer was
entitled to summary judgment.
In Union Carbide Corp. v. Mayfield,96 the plaintiff went to work for the
employer as an operator. In that position he was required to climb stairs
and ladders on a regular basis. The plaintiff suffered from "extreme spes
planus or flat-footednesss" in both feet. The plaintiff worked several
years enduring the pain caused by his condition. Because he also worked
on the employer's emergency response team, the plaintiff had to demon-
strate that he was physically fit to serve in that capacity.97 At one of
those physicals, the plaintiff's foot was swollen, and the plaintiff com-
plained of pain. The company's physician sent the plaintiff to a podiatrist
who recommended that the plaintiff not climb ladders or stairs. The com-
pany's doctor concluded that the plaintiff should be permanently re-
stricted from ladder and scaffold work as well as frequent stair climbing.
The doctor based his conclusion on the podiatrist's opinion, the plaintiff's
several year history of pain, past recommendations that continued stand-
ing or climbing would cause irreparable damage to the tendons in his
foot, and that he might fall and hurt himself or someone else. Despite the
medical recommendations, the plaintiff wanted to remain in the operator
position and told the employer he could work without any restrictions.
The employer ignored the plaintiff's request. Instead, the employer of-
fered the plaintiff a lesser paying safety position. The plaintiff refused the
position and was terminated.98
At trial, the jury found that the employer had violated the TCHRA by
terminating the plaintiff because of his disability.99 On appeal the court
held that his condition-flat footedness-was not, as a matter of law, a
condition that limited him in any major life activity because he was not
excluded from a broad range of jobs.100 Consequently, the court reversed
the jury's findings and rendered judgment in favor of the employer. 1 1
94. 255 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2001).
95. 255 F.3d at 258 (citing Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 695, 807
(1999)).
96. 66 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
97. Id. at 358-59.
98. Id. at 359.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 366.
101. Mayfield, 66 S.W.3d at 368.
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5. Race and National Origin Discrimination
Summary judgment cases prior to Reeves routinely skipped considera-
tion of a plaintiff's prima facie case in favor of an analysis of a plaintiff's
evidence casting doubt upon an employer's nondiscriminatory explana-
tion of its employment decision. Since Reeves, this trend has changed;
employers, when appropriate, have sought summary judgment based on a
deficiency in a plaintiff's prima facie case.
In Lacy v. ADP, Inc.,102 the plaintiff worked in the employer's mainte-
nance department. In violation of his employer's policy, the plaintiff pro-
vided himself with an unauthorized fringe benefit when he recharged his
car's air-conditioning system with freon from the maintenance shop. Af-
ter the employee admitted his conduct, the employer terminated him.
The plaintiff sued contending that his termination was because of his
race. 10 3 The employer challenged the plaintiff's prima facie case in two
ways.104 First, the employer contended the plaintiff's violation of its eth-
ics policy rendered him "unqualified.'1 0 5 Second, the employer con-
tended that it did not hire anyone to replace the plaintiff, although it had
hired a white male a week before the termination. 10 6 The court held that
because of the lack of severity of the theft, the jury should decide
whether the incident rendered the plaintiff unqualified for the position.'07
Further, since a worker who was not African-American assumed some of
the plaintiff's responsibilities, the plaintiff established a prima facie case
of discrimination.' 0 8
The plaintiff, however, could not establish pretext. 0 9 His conclusory
allegation that others engaged in similar conduct but were not terminated
was irrelevant without evidence that the employer was aware of the other
circumstances. Because no such evidence existed, coupled with evidence
to establish the same actor inference, the court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment." 0
In Chavez v. McDonald's Corp.,'" the plaintiff was terminated for
charging personal expenses to his corporate credit card. The court agreed
with the defendant that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case
because another Hispanic employee replaced him.' 12 The plaintiff at-
tempted to persuade the court to reject this argument because the plain-
tiff was a "more zealous" advocate of his Hispanic ethnicity. The court
rejected the plaintiff's theory because it had no legal or factual sup-
102. No. CIV.A.3:OOACV-2678, 2001 WL 1006064 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001).
103. Id. at *2.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Lacy, 2001 WL 1006064, at *3.
108. Id. at *3.
109. Id. at *3-5.
110. Id. at *5.




port. 13 In dicta, the court stated that had the plaintiff established that
the person hired to replace him came from another country, the national
origin claim would have survived. 114
The theory that a plaintiff is more-protected because of his or her par-
ticular minority viewpoint was also an issue in Segura v. Texas Dep't of
Human Services.'1t 5 In Segura, the Texas Department of Human Services
("TDHS") received a complaint concerning inappropriate information
stored on a TDHS computer. TDHS determined that several files stored
on two of its employees' computers were inappropriate, sexual in nature,
non-work related, and in violation of various agency rules and policies.
After the files were discovered, TDHS initiated an investigation. Due to
the plaintiffs' involvement in the incident, one plaintiff was demoted from
a supervisor to a non-supervisory position, and the other received a
three-day suspension without pay. The plaintiffs asserted various causes
of action against TDHS.116 The plaintiffs indicated that TDHS has en-
gaged in oppression, racism, and even genocide in its treatment of mem-
bers affiliated with the "Raza" political movement. The plaintiffs also
sought "redress for over 500 years of oppression."'1 17 The plaintiffs con-
tended that they were discriminated against because they were treated
differently than non-Raza employees.' 18
TDHS challenged whether plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case
of discrimination because they could not establish they belonged to a pro-
tected group and that other employees, non-members of their protected
group, were treated differently under "nearly identical circumstances."' 19
According to plaintiffs, they were members of Raza, a protected group.
The plaintiffs contended that individuals, even of Mexican-American de-
cent, are no longer protected because they have adopted non-indigenous
(European) cultural practices and have become "white" in order to suc-
ceed. In effect, the plaintiffs contended that they were similar to the Na-
tive Americans. The court, however, noted that plaintiffs' self-
designation of themselves as "Raza," because of their refusal "to become
white," does not automatically make them members of a protected cate-
gory under Title VII.1 2° Even if TDHS discriminated against plaintiffs
because they refused to "think like white people" or "give into the white
establishment," such a discriminatory practice based on an "immutable
characteristic" is not protected by Title VII. 121 The only protected na-
tional origin group that plaintiffs might have belonged to would be that of
Hispanic or Latino. The plaintiffs, however, strongly objected to inclu-
sion in that group. As a result, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. No. CIV.A.SA-00-LA-0229-OG, 2001 WL 681748 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2001).
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Segura, 2001 WL 681748, at *15.
121. See id. at *15.
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failed to establish an element of their prima facie case and that TDHS
was entitled to summary judgment. 2 2
This Survey period, several cases addressed what constitutes an action-
able employer decision. In Luckman v. United Parcel Service,'123 the
plaintiff worked as an aircraft mechanic for UPS. The plaintiff claimed
that UPS discriminated against him by suspending him for three weeks to
undergo psychological testing, assigning him to work alone even though
other mechanics worked in groups of two or more, and issuing him writ-
ten warning letters in retaliation for his complaints of discrimination. 12 4
When sent to undergo psychological testing, a nurse reported that the
plaintiff "is of Ethiopian descent and has a marked accent. 1 25 The court
held that such a statement, as a matter of law, did not amount to direct
evidence of discrimination. 1 26 The court also held that none of the plain-
tiff's allegations rose to the level of adverse employment actions; there-
fore, summary judgment was proper.127 In particular, the court found
that the plaintiff's suspension was not actionable because the plaintiff re-
ceived full compensation while off work. 12 8 Had the plaintiff been able
to show that the suspension caused him some other detriment,1 2 9 the case
might have had a different result.' 30 The court also rejected the plaintiff's
hostile environment claim because being assigned to work alone is not, in
the "totality of the circumstances," "extreme" conduct sufficient to estab-
lish a triable claim.' 3 1
The semantic distinction between an "ultimate employment action"
and an "adverse employment action" was addressed head on in Craven v.
Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division.132 In Craven,
a correctional officer brought a reverse-race discrimination claim alleging
discrimination based on a failure to transfer and subsequent retalia-
tion.1 33 The plaintiff sought a transfer to the first shift, a preferable time
slot. No interviews were conducted, and another correctional officer, an
African-American, was selected for the shift. After the selection, the
plaintiff complained about the selection and the selection process and,
again, requested that she be reassigned to the first-shift position. After
her request was denied, she filed a grievance. A few days after filing her
grievance, she received a written reprimand for violating facility regula-
tions. She was also transferred from her facility to work with "general
122. Id.
123. No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-0739G, 2001 WL 1029523 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2001).
124. Id. at *2.
125. Luckman, 2001 WL 1029523, at *4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *5.
129. The court also noted the result may have been different in a jurisdiction outside
the Fifth Circuit. Id.
130. Luckman, 2001 WL 1029523, at *5.
131. Id. at *8.




population" inmates. She was not formally demoted, however, and suf-
fered no loss in pay or benefits.134 Approximately three months later, the
plaintiff was transferred to the first shift after another vacancy
developed. 135
In analyzing the plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims, the
court confessed "some confusion and frustration as to the proper termi-
nology" for Title VII's discrimination claims.136 The court noted that em-
ployer conduct that will satisfy discrimination claims is generally broader
than conduct that will satisfy retaliation claims.137 The court, however,
noted that the Fifth Circuit has used the terms "ultimate employment
decision" and an "adverse employment action" interchangeably in ana-
lyzing retaliation claims while using the term "adverse employment ac-
tion" for discrimination claims.' 38 Because the plaintiff had not offered
any summary judgment evidence establishing a difference between the
night shift and the morning shift in terms of benefits, responsibilities, or
other terms, conditions and privileges of employment, the court con-
cluded the plaintiff had not suffered an adverse employment action.
139
As for the retaliation claim, the court concluded that the written repri-
mand also did not rise to the level of an "ultimate employment action. ' 140
Before Reeves, an employee terminated for making threats had diffi-
culty defeating summary judgment because of the difficulty in showing
that the decisionmaker did not consider the conduct threatening. In Mc-
Kinney v. Texas Department of Transportation,'4' the court held that
Reeves does not affect "the availability of summary judgment" in such
cases. The plaintiff had worked for the employer for twelve years.'
42
During that time, he had a history of performance problems. While in a
meeting, the plaintiff made a statement that others in attendance consid-
ered to be "a threat."' 43 The plaintiff contended that the real reason for
his termination was because of his race. 144
The court held that the plaintiff's evidence attempting to justify the
statements he made did not create a fact issue. 145 The plaintiff's mere
disagreement with the facts that led to various forms of discipline was
insufficient to cast doubt on the employer's belief that it was taking ap-
134. Id. at 762.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 765. A few months later, the Fifth Circuit held that retaliation claims require
that the plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action defined as "ultimate employment
decisions . . .such as hiring, granting leave, discharge, promoting, and compensating."
Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2001). See infra note
191.
137. Craven, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
138. Id. at 765-67.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 167 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
142. Id. at 925.
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propriate action based on the plaintiff's conduct. 146 For example, the
plaintiff's denial that he made a "threat" is irrelevant; "the focus of the
pretext inquiry is not how [the plaintiff] would characterize his behavior,
but how [the employer] understood it.' 4 7
The court also classified evidence of racial slurs as "stray remarks."'1 48
The court noted that, regardless of the framework used, the "principle
focus in the analysis of derogatory remarks continues to be the identity of
the speaker. ' 149 Thus, borrowing from the Reeves decision, the court
held that the plaintiff had not introduced evidence that any supervisor
"principally responsible" for making employment decisions had made
any racial slurs. Consequently, the court ignored the evidence of racial
slurs as mere stray remarks.150
At issue in Blow v. City of San Antonio15' was whether the employer's
failure to follow its own hiring policies and procedures created a jury
question in a race discrimination, failure to promote case. In Blow, the
employer did not follow its policy of advertising a job opening within the
department. The plaintiff alleged that, once she learned of the opening,
she alleges she was discouraged to submit an application. The court held
that these facts cast doubt on the employer's explanation that the plaintiff
had not submitted a timely application and created a question for the
jury.152
Choosing an inexperienced candidate over an experienced but poor-
performing candidate will likely lead to a fact issue. In Jinks v. Advanced
Protection Systems, Inc.,153 the court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment with respect to a race promotion claim. The plaintiff
had applied for two promotions. She first applied for the position of ad-
ministrative assistant to a vice president. After she was not chosen, the
employer promoted the plaintiff to the position of customer service coor-
dinator. While in this position, she expressed an interest in a promotion
to a customer service manager position. The plaintiff, who was African-
American, was not chosen. The position was given to a Caucasian.
The employer asserted that it decided to not select the plaintiff for the
administrative assistant position because of concerns about her ability to
get along with co-workers. 154 The plaintiff's evidence of pretext was that
the employer had not documented any concerns about her ability to get
along with other workers. Because the plaintiff offered no evidence that
the employer routinely documented such matters in an employee's per-
sonnel file, the evidence could not permit a "reasonable trier of fact" to
146. McKinney, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
147. Id. at 929.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 931.
150. Id.
151. 236 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 297-98.
153. 162 F. Supp. 2d 542 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
154. Id. at 547.
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find that the true reason for the decision was her race. 155 The court also
rejected the plaintiff's contention that she was more qualified than the
chosen candidate because she had to teach the candidate certain com-
puter applications to perform the job.156 The court held that this did not
establish evidence of pretext because the decisionmaker had not relied
solely on relative computer skills in making his selection.157
Next, the court considered whether the plaintiff established pretext as
to her application to the customer service manager position. 158 The deci-
sionmaker chose an employee with whom he had worked in the past. He
was generally impressed with the employee's work ethic and ability to
interact positively with customers and co-workers. The decisionmaker
did not consider the plaintiff because of a general awareness that the
plaintiff had difficulties getting along with co-workers. The deci-
sionmaker also testified that he witnessed the plaintiff's performance of a
"dry run" of a customer service call and was not impressed with her work
performance. The court found that a fact issue was created, however,
because the decisionmaker selected a twenty-two-year-old attending col-
lege, with no prior customer service experience. 159 The court noted that
the decisionmaker never really considered Jenks who was the current cus-
tomer service supervisor, had over ten years customer service experience,
and had to train the selected candidate regarding the employer's proce-
dures. 160 Based on this evidence, the court held that the plaintiff had
established a triable issue of race discrimination in connection with the
customer service manager promotion decision. 161
6. Age Discrimination
That Reeves impacts discrimination litigation was apparent in an age
discrimination case, Ratliff v. City of Gainesville,162 where the employer
won at trial. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the jury instructions did
not comport with Reeves.163 The plaintiff asserted that the trial court in-
corporated the "pretext plus" standard in contravention of the "permis-
sive pretext standard" established in Reeves. Under the permissive
pretext standard, once the plaintiff establishes that the employer's reason
is pretextual, "the trier of fact is permitted, but not required, to enter
judgment for the plaintiff."'1 64 The court then held that Reeves eliminated
the pretext-plus standard, and, as a result, the plaintiff was entitled to a
new trial.165
155. Id.
156. Id. at 548.
157. Id.
158. Jinks, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
159. Id. at 551.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 256 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2001).
163. Id. at 360.
164. Id. at 361.
165. Id. at 362, 364.
[Vol. 55
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
In Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co.,166 the Fifth Circuit highlighted the risk
of using subjective hiring criteria. The plaintiff sought to fill an outside
sales position requiring "substantial sales experience. 1 167 In holding that
the employer's motion for summary judgment should be denied, the court
wrote "an employer may not 'utilize wholly subjective standards by which
to judge its employees' qualifications and then plead lack of qualification
when its promotion process ... is challenged as discriminatory.'-"168 The
plaintiff, who had several years of sales experience in another industry,
was passed over twice for an outside sales position, each time in favor of
someone twenty-five years younger. Due to the subjective qualification
standard and evidence of stray remarks, the court held that the plaintiff's
age discrimination claims should go to trial. 169
In Thompson v. Origin Technology in Business, Inc.,170 the plaintiff as-
serted age discrimination claims associated with a demotion arising from
a reduction in force ("RIF") and a later termination. With respect to the
demotion claim, the court held that in a RIF case, the plaintiff must only
show that significantly younger employees were retained, not that the
younger employees were less qualified. 171 Another unique aspect of RIF
cases is that an employee's evidence of good performance is not as signifi-
cant as in a case arising out of termination for cause. The court held as a
matter of law that "the plaintiff's good performance and absence of com-
plaints in his previous position are insufficient by themselves to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. '172
The court reached a different result on the termination claim. The em-
ployer submitted evidence from a non-decisionmaker to establish the le-
gitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination. 173 The
plaintiff challenged the evidence because the affiant did not have per-
sonal knowledge of the reasons for the termination. The court agreed
and struck portions of the affidavit.174 The court also concluded that,
even if the evidence was admissible, the plaintiff had established pretext
because of an "inappropriate" post-termination stray remark made by the
decisionmaker.175 Even though the comment occurred after the plain-
tiff's termination, the fact that the employer disciplined the deci-
sionmaker led the court to conclude that the remark satisfied the four-
part CSC Logic1 76 test.177 The court also rejected the employer's conten-
tion that the same actor inference entitled the employer to summary
166. 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001).
167. Id. at 678.
168. Id. at 681 (citing Crawford v. W. Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980)).
169. Id. at 682-84.
170. No. 3:99-CV-2077-C, 2001 WL 1018748, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2001).
171. Id. at *6.
172. Id. at *7.
173. Id. at *3.
174. Id.
175. Thompson, 2001 WL 1018748, at *4.
176. Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996).
177. No. 3:99-CV-2077-L, 2001 WL 1018748, at *8 n.16.
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judgment. 78 Because the plaintiff, who was 63 when hired and 64 when
terminated, offered evidence that he was not hired by the decisionmaker,
the court found that the same actor inference did not apply.179
7. Title VII and TCHRA Retaliation
The Supreme Court's decision in Clark County School District v.
Breeden'80 will become the case upon which employers rely in motions
for summary judgment for years to come. In Breeden, the plaintiff al-
leged that her employer retaliated against her after she complained of
sexual harassment.181 She and two co-workers were reviewing psycholog-
ical assessment reports of four applicants. In one of the assessments, it
was reported that an applicant had once made an inappropriate sexual
comment.' 82 The plaintiff's co-workers laughed about the comment and
the plaintiff complained. At issue before the Court was whether the
plaintiff's complaint was in opposition to an unlawful practice or to a
practice that she reasonably believed was unlawful. The Court held that
no person could reasonably believe that the single event about which she
complained violated Title VII.183
The Court also rejected the plaintiff's attempt to establish a causal con-
nection between her filing of an EEOC charge and subsequent lawsuit
with an involuntary transfer. 84 Because the employer was considering
the transfer before it learned of the lawsuit, the court held that
"[e]mployers need not suspend previously planned transfers upon discov-
ering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines
previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no
evidence whatever of causality."' 85
The Breeden case is significant because complaints of harassment for
isolated events or comments will not automatically be considered pro-
tected activity. Breeden also stands for the proposition that institutional
knowledge of a complaint will not automatically be imputed to the deci-
sionmaker. While neither of these theories is new, having the Court's
imprimatur will make it more difficult for plaintiffs at the summary judg-
ment stage.
That Breeden does not create new law is exemplified by Chavez v. Mc-
Donald's Corp.186 In Chavez, the plaintiff contended that he was termi-
nated in retaliation for making complaints of discrimination about his
supervisor. The supervisor initiated an investigation of the plaintiff's po-
178. Id. at *9.
179. Id.
180. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
181. Id. at 269-70.
182. Id. at 269.
183. Id. at 270, 271.
184. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 272-74.
185. Id. at 272.
186. No. CIV.A.3:99CV1718D, 2001 WL 194941 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2001). See also
supra note 111.
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tential credit card malfeasance. Based on the results of the investigation,
another manager made the decision to terminate the plaintiff. The em-
ployer contended that the decisionmaker was not aware of the plaintiff's
prior complaints of discrimination or of the filing of an EEOC charge of
discrimination.187
The court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish a causal nexus
between the complaint and the plaintiff's termination. 188 The court re-
jected the plaintiff's claim that the retaliation complaint was tied to his
supervisor's initiation of the investigation of credit card malfeasance,
which led to the plaintiff's termination. Because the supervisor is the per-
son about whom the plaintiff had complained, the plaintiff contended
that the subsequent investigation was tainted by his supervisor's retalia-
tory motive. The court rejected this theory because the jury could not
conclude that the decisionmaker was aware of the protected activity.189
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment.1 90
In Mota v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center,191 the
employer conceded that the employee engaged in protected activity. The
plaintiff contended that his employer retaliated against him after filing a
sexual harassment complaint alleging that the head of the Periodontics
Department engaged in unwanted and offensive sexual advances while
attending conferences across the country. A jury concluded that the
plaintiff was subjected to unlawful sexual harassment, that the harass-
ment did not result in a tangible employment action, that the employer
failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the harassing behavior, and
that the employer unlawfully retaliated against the plaintiff.1 92 On ap-
peal, the employer argued that the retaliation claim must fail because the
jury found that no "tangible employment action" had occurred. 93 Al-
though the court noted that the retaliation claim requires evidence of an
"adverse employment action," it noted the similarity between the two
concepts. Nonetheless, the court held that the jury's finding of an ad-
verse employment action to support the retaliation claim was not incon-
sistent with its finding of no tangible employment action. 194 The court
reasoned that a "rational jury could have concluded both that no tangible
employment action resulted from the harassment and that [the employer]
subsequently retaliated against [the plaintiff] for filing a complaint. ' 195
187. Id. at *3.
188. Id. at *4.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 261 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2001).
192. Id. at 518-19.
193. Id. at 520.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 520.
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B. WORKERS' COMPENSATION RETALIATION
In Alayon v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,196 the issue was whether the plaintiff
produced sufficient summary judgment evidence to allow his workers'
compensation retaliation claim under Texas Labor Code section 451.001
to proceed to trial. The employer contended that it terminated the plain-
tiff because he worked as a personal trainer at another job while refusing
to work for Delta because of medical restrictions. 97 The employer's
workers' compensation insurance carrier had investigated the plaintiff.
During the investigation the insurance company learned that the plaintiff
was working as a personal trainer at a gym. The investigator videotaped
the plaintiff while at work and then presented the results of the investiga-
tion to the employer. After reviewing the results of the investigation, the
employer terminated the plaintiff.198
At issue was whether the plaintiff could introduce sufficient evidence
to cast doubt upon the reasons for his termination. A material fact issue
existed because the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to perform light-
duty work while others were allowed to perform such work and light-duty
jobs were available.' 99 In addition, the employer failed to adhere to its
termination policies in making its termination decision.200 The plaintiff
further introduced competent summary judgment evidence that disputed
whether he had violated the medical restriction while working as a per-
sonal trainer. For these reasons the court determined that a material fact
issue existed and remanded the case for trial.20'
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Garza,202 the court held that suf-
ficient evidence supported a jury determination in favor of the plaintiff
on his worker's compensation retaliation case. The plaintiff worked for
Southwestern Bell for over twenty years and sustained a work-related in-
jury to his head and neck in an incident that occurred when a co-worker
lowered a hydraulic crane-bucket directly above plaintiff's head.203 After
the incident, the plaintiff and his co-worker had a verbal confrontation.
The co-worker then reported the conduct to a supervisor, Ruben Gonza-
les. The plaintiff did not immediately report the injury. The supervisor
nonetheless conducted an investigation and concluded that it was impos-
sible to determine exactly what had happened. Consequently, he decided
to allow the plaintiff to return to work. Over the weekend, the plaintiff
began to experience significant pain in his head and neck. When he re-
turned to work, the plaintiff reported the injury to his first line supervi-
sor, Rene Robles, and requested medical treatment.2
0 4
196. 59 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. filed).
197. Id. at 285.
198. Id. at 288.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 288-89.
201. Alayon, 59 S.W.3d at 289.
202. 58 S.W.3d 214, 239 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed).
203. Id. at 219.
204. Id. at 220.
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Because he sought medical treatment, a new investigation ensued.205
In connection with that investigation, a regional manager directed the
plaintiff's supervisor to review the plaintiff's entire twenty-year work his-
tory. In that process, the supervisor drafted a report highly critical of
plaintiff's safety record. The report identified ten "accidents" and five
unsatisfactory safety reviews over the previous twenty years.206 Because
of the report, the supervisor reversed his prior decision, disqualified
plaintiff from his outside plant technician position, and took away his
driving privileges-a decision which disqualified him from most of the
jobs that he had performed in the previous twenty years.207 At trial, the
jury concluded that the employer retaliated against the plaintiff for filing
a workers' compensation claim. The jury awarded the plaintiff approxi-
mately $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.208
On appeal, the employer attacked the jury charge and the sufficiency of
the evidence.209 The court concluded that (1) the employer had waived
any objections to the jury instructions by not making a timely objection at
trial and (2) the jury charge, based on the text of the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act, was not in error.210 Further, the court held that there
was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. In particular, the
court found evidence in the record that satisfied the plaintiff's burden to
establish that but for filing his worker's compensation claim he would not
have been discriminated against or discharged. The court placed signifi-
cant importance on the fact that until the plaintiff sought medical treat-
ment, the incident was considered minor, and the plaintiff would have
only received a verbal reprimand for his confrontation with a co-worker.
Once he sought medical treatment, however, there was evidence of a neg-
ative attitude toward the plaintiff's injured condition and/or his filing of a
workers' compensation claim. Further, there was never any evidence to
suggest that the plaintiff was at fault or had acted in an unsafe manner
that led to his injury. The fact that the employer used the incident and
then resurrected every minor accident in the plaintiff's twenty year work
history displayed a negative attitude concerning the plaintiff's filing of the
worker's compensation claim. The court held that the jury's damage
award was not excessive and sustained the trial court's verdict in its
entirety.211
In another worker's compensation retaliation case, Glass v. Amber,
Inc.,212 the trial court took away a jury award of $63,000 in compensatory
damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the plaintiff
claimed that the jury's finding was supported by sufficient evidence. The
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Garza, 58 S.W.3d at 219.
208. Id. at 223-28.
209. Id. at 226.
210. Id. at 229.
211. Id. at 239.
212. No. 01-00-00589-CV, 2001 WL 893947, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug.
9, 2001, no pet. h.).
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court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding that there was more than
a scintilla of evidence to support the jury's verdict.213
New evidence showed the plaintiff had received good performance
evaluations for eight years; however, on the date of his termination, he
received a poor evaluation. 214 That evaluation was completed by the
same person with whom he had been discussing his workers' compensa-
tion claim. The court did not consider the employer's defense that it did
not receive notice of an actual workers' compensation claim until after
the date that plaintiff was terminated.215 Consistent with other Texas
holdings, a workers' compensation retaliation claim is a "viable cause of
action when an employee is fired once he or she has begun taking steps
towards instituting a proceeding for collecting worker's compensation
benefits. '21 6 Additionally, there was evidence that the employer did not
consistently or uniformly apply its absence policy. Further, a company's
incentive program designed to encourage employees to refrain from re-
porting on-the-job injuries may be circumstantial evidence to support the
workers' compensation retaliation claim.217 Because the employer had
such a safety incentive program, where cash was distributed to those
workers who reported no injuries, the court held that this evidence along
with the other evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the
jury's determination. 218
As to the jury's finding of punitive damages, however, the court found
no evidence to support a finding of actual malice.219 The court noted that
all of the evidence relied upon by the plaintiff only related to his claim
that his termination was unlawful. The court found no other "additional
egregious act" upon which to base an award of punitive damages.220
C. OTHER WORKERS' COMPENSATION AcT CLAIMS: NONSUBSCRIBERS
Some nonsubscribing employers have attempted to have their cake and
eat it too by implementing their own benefit plan for work-related inju-
ries, and requiring participating employees to limit their benefits to those
under the plan. These employers often condition participation in the plan
on whether the employee agrees to waive prospectively the right to sue
their employer for work-related injuries. In this way, the employer
avoids the cost of premiums and administration associated with being a
subscriber and seemingly eliminates its exposure for work-related injuries
beyond the benefits provided under the plan.
213. Id. at *8.
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id. at *4.
216. Id. (citing Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1992, no writ)).
217. Glass, 2001 WL 893947, at *6-7.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *8.
220. Id.
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Texas courts were split on the issue of whether a nonsubscribing em-
ployer could offer its employees a voluntary, pre-injury release in ex-
change for medical benefits under the employer's medical plan. This
conflict was resolved in Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc.2 21 In Lawrence,
the Texas Supreme Court determined that an employer's offer of medical
benefits in exchange for a release of common law claims does not violate
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act and does not violate public
policy. 22
2
Prior to this decision, several courts held that pre-injury releases were
invalid when the level of benefits the employer provided was not on par
with the benefits available under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.
The Texas Supreme Court specifically rejected this benefit-comparison
approach as "ill-advised. '22 3 The Lawrence court also noted that, while
permitting such releases may affect the workers' compensation scheme
designed by the Texas Legislature, there is no prohibition in the Act
against these releases, and it is the Legislature's responsibility to remedy
the issue if it so desires. 22 4 That is exactly what happened just a few
months after the Lawrence case was decided.
On June 17, 2001, Governor Rick Perry signed H.B. 2600-passed by a
supermajority of the Texas House and Senate-making a prospective
waiver related to an on the job injury void. Accordingly, an employee
may not waive the right to sue an employer before the employee's injury
or death as part of a workers' compensation opt-out program. Signifi-
cantly, the new legislation does not address retrospective waivers. There-
fore, this new law does not affect employers that utilize a post-injury
waiver as part of an opt-out program.
Texas employers have the option of deciding whether or not to provide
workers' compensation coverage for their employees who are injured on
the job. If employers choose to participate in the workers' compensation
system, they are generally immune from personal-injury lawsuits brought
by injured employees. If, on the other hand, employers choose not to
provide such coverage, they lose that immunity as well as important com-
mon-law defenses, such as assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence.
D. TEXAS WHISTLEBLOWER ACT CLAIMS
In Nichols v. Healthsouth Corp.,225 the plaintiff, a licensed occupational
therapist, alleged that she had been disciplined and terminated from her
employment with Healthsouth in violation of Section 161.134 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code. The plaintiff alleged that she refused to leave
several of her patients unattended to perform a test on another patient in
221. 44 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2001).
222. Id. at 554.
223. Id. at 551.
224. Id. at 554.
225. No. CIV.A3:00-CV-1487-P, 2001 WL 1081288 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 12, 2001).
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another room of Healthsouth's facility. 226 As a result of her refusal to
perform the second test, Healthsouth disciplined the plaintiff for "not be-
ing flexible" and "having a negative attitude. '227
The court held that the facility where the plaintiff worked was not a
"treatment facility" and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to statu-
tory protection and granted summary judgment in favor of
Healthsouth. 228
E. TRADITIONAL LABOR LAW
In NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. ,229 a union sought to
represent a unit of employees that included the employer's registered
nurses. The employer objected to the inclusion of the nurses within the
unit, contending that the nurses were supervisors under the National La-
bor Relations Act.230 The employer refused to bargain with the union,
leading to the NLRB's issuance of a bargaining order, which the em-
ployer chose not to obey.231 After the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce
the order, the case went to the Supreme Court.
232
The Court concluded that it was the employer's burden to prove super-
visory status but held that the Board's test for determining whether a
worker was a supervisor or an employee protected by the Act was incon-
sistent with the Act.23 3 Under the Act, a worker may be a supervisor if
the worker exercises, inter alia, "independent judgment. '234 The Board
excluded from the definition of "independent judgment" workers who ex-
ercise ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled
employees.235 Justice Scalia, writing for the court, concluded that "if the
Board applied this aspect of its test to every exercise of a supervisory
function, it would virtually eliminate 'supervisors' from the Act. '236 The
Court found that the Board's interpretation improperly limited the Act
and therefore its bargaining order could not be enforced.
In Williams v. Simmons Co.,237 two union members filed suit against
their union and their employer alleging (1) that the union had breached
its duty to represent the plaintiffs; (2) that the employer had breached the
collective bargaining agreement; and (3) that the employer had discrimi-
nated against them because of their race and age. The two plaintiffs
worked as hogringers, a job that required placing borders around the
226. Id.
227. Id. at *1.
228. Id. at *6.
229. 121 S. Ct. 1861 (2001).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2001).
231. Ky. River Comty. Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1863.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1863-64.
234. Id. at 1864.
235. Id.
236. Ky. River Comty. Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1868.
237. No. 3:99-CV-2964-P, 2001 WL 1262220 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2001).
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outside of a mattress.238 The employer, consistent with the collective bar-
gaining agreement, implemented a new pay program tied to production
levels. The employer issued progressive discipline against the plaintiffs
for failure to meet production levels.239 After exhausting the progressive
discipline system, the employer terminated the plaintiffs.240
The plaintiffs complained that the production standards were too harsh
and filed a grievance against the employer. 241 While the grievance was
pending, the union conducted a time study, which indicated that the stan-
dards were appropriate and consistent with other similar plants. As a
result the union negotiated a "Last Chance Agreement" ("LCA"). The
LCA allowed the employees to return to work, but waived any opportu-
nity for processing a second grievance based on violation of the produc-
tion standards. 242 Eventually, the employees did not meet the production
standards and were terminated and filed grievances. The union refused
to process the grievances.
The employees sued under Section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act,243 alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by the
union.244 In the hybrid claim, the plaintiffs' burden was to establish that
the employer violated the contract and demonstrate that the union
breached its duty of fair representation. The court noted that to establish
a breach of the duty of fair representation the union's conduct must be
"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. '245 The plaintiffs asserted that
the union breached its duty by (1) not taking the initial grievance to arbi-
tration; (2) not discussing the terms of the LCA with plaintiffs prior to
their return to work; (3) accepting the terms of the LCA which the plain-
tiffs contended was unfair; and (4) not pursuing the second grievance to
arbitration.246 The court rejected each of these grounds because the
union's decision making process was not in bad faith, arbitrary, or dis-
criminatory. The court noted that the union had examined the first griev-
ance and determined that it would not prevail if it pursued the grievance
to arbitration.247 The court also noted that the LCAs negotiated on the
plaintiffs' behalf indicated that the union was attempting to protect the
plaintiffs' jobs. In addition, because the LCAs did not provide for the
opportunity to process a second grievance for termination based on viola-
tion of production standards, the court found that the union's decision
not to pursue a second grievance was not a violation of its duty of fair
representation. 248




242. Williams, 2001 WL 1262220, at *1.
243. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2001).
244. Williams, 2001 WL 1262220, at *2.
245. Id. at *6 (citing Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at *6-8.
248. Id. at 9.
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The plaintiffs' claims of race and age discrimination were also dis-
missed by the court on summary judgment.249 The court found that the
plaintiffs could not establish that the employer's legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for its decisions were pretext for age or race discrimina-
tion. The court held that a remark by a manager to one of the plaintiffs,
suggesting that he retire, was not age discrimination.250
III. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
During the Survey period, the courts in Texas have continued to apply
the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. 25' For example, in Hamilton
v. Segue Software, Inc.,252 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
language of an offer letter, which stated an annual rate of salary, did not
create a definite contract of employment for a period of one year. The
court found that the letter itself included at-will language and did not
limit the employer's ability to terminate at-will in a "meaningful and spe-
cial way."'253 The Fifth Circuit relied in large part on the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in Montgomery County Hospital District v. Brown,254 in
which the court required that employees demonstrate an "'unequivocal'
intent of non-at-will status in their contracts. ' 255 Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that a statement of an annualized base salary does not pro-
vide a guarantee of employment but merely provides a benchmark to
evaluate an employee's pay. 256
In the context of an employee manual, the Waco Court of Appeals in
Guinn v. Bosque County257 upheld summary judgment in favor of the
employer on grounds that the language of the employee manual did not
alter the at-will nature of employment. In this case, the employee argued
that the employee manual formed an employment contract because (1)
the manual did not contain an express disclaimer that it was not an em-
ployment contract, (2) the manual included a provision that an employee
may be dismissed for "just cause," and (3) the introductory paragraph of
the employee manual states that the manual defines the "rights and privi-
leges" of county employees. 258 In addition, the employee argued that the
manual requires an employee to give ten days written notice in order to
resign in good standing and that the county adopted the manual for "the
249. Williams, 2001 WL 126220, at *13.
250. Id.
251. Employment-at-will means "absent a specific agreement to the contrary, employ-
ment may be terminated by the employer or the employee at will, for good cause, bad
cause, or no cause at all." Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502
(Tex. 1998).
252. 232 F.3d 473, 471 (5th Cir. 2000).
253. Id. at 478.
254. 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998).
255. Hamilton, 232 F.3d at 479.
256. Id. at 480.
257. 58 S.W.3d 194, 201 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. filed).
258. Id. at 200.
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mutual benefit" of the county and its employees. 259 Because of this lan-
guage, the employee argued that the employee manual was intended to
be a written contract that altered the at-will employment nature of the
plaintiff's employment. 260 The Waco Court of Appeals upheld summary
judgment in favor of the employer. 261
The court held that a personnel manual may modify the traditional at-
will rule but only if it "specifically and expressly" curtails the employer's
right to terminate the employee.262 The terms the employee relied upon
did nothing to "specifically and expressly" limit the grounds for dismissal
of the plaintiff, and instead provided general personnel guidelines for the
county and its employees. 263
Generalized oral promises of "employment for life" fare no better in
the courts than written instruments. In Runge v. Raytheon E-Systems,
Inc.,264 the plaintiff argued that his supervisor's statements, that the job
was an "opportunity of a lifetime" or "a job for life," uttered in a job
interview altered the employment-at-will relationship. The Waco Court
of Appeals held the statements were not specific enough to alter the em-
ployment-at-will relationship and affirmed summary judgment for the
employer. 265
In addition to arguments that written instruments or oral statements
form the basis of an employment contract, employees often argue that
public policy should abrogate the at-will doctrine. For example, in Guient
v. Hogan & Associates,266 the plaintiff maintained that an employer with
less than fifteen employees should be subject to lawsuits for sexual har-
assment and retaliation even though the employer is not subject to the
TCHRA.267 The plaintiff alleged that she was sexually harassed by the
president of the defendant/employer and that she had been terminated in
retaliation for complaining of the harassment. Because the employer had
less than 15 employees, however, it was not liable for unlawful employ-
ment practices under the TCHRA. The plaintiff argued in favor of a
common law exception because sexual harassment in the workplace vio-
lates public policy in Texas. 268 The Dallas Court of Appeals, however,
declined to expand the at-will doctrine to include a common law cause of
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 201.
262. Guinn, 58 S.W.3d at 200.
263. Id. at 201.
264. No. 10-00-013-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6060 (Tex. App.-Waco Aug. 31, 2001,
no pet. h.).
265. Id. at *8.
266. No. 05-98-01560-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4285 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 28,
2001, pet. denied) (unpublished opinion).
267. For purposes of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, an employer is de-
fined in part as "a person who is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and who has
15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(8)(A) (Vernon
1996).
268. Guient, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 4285, at *7.
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action for constructive discharge based on sexual harassment or retalia-
tion. The court reasoned that it is not for an intermediate appellate court
to enlarge or extend the grounds for wrongful discharge under the at-will
doctrine. 269 Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor
of the employer.2 70
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court did not issue an
opinion in an employment case with respect to a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In Bradford v. Vento, 271 however, the
court was confronted with the issue of outrageous conduct in the context
of a business dispute involving the attempted purchase of a sports
memorabilia store at a shopping mall in Harlingen, Texas. During one of
several confrontations between the parties, one defendant, the mall man-
agement company, called mall security and the police and allegedly made
misrepresentations to the police that the plaintiff was not the true owner
of the store and threatened to file criminal trespassing charges against the
plaintiff if he returned to the store.272 The court held that these actions
were not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law because the defen-
dant was permissibly exercising his rights as a mall manager.2 73
In GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce,2 74 the Texas Supreme Court ruled
that in rare circumstances an employee could maintain a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his employer. Fol-
lowing this holding, questions remain as to the level of outrageous con-
duct that must be proved in order prevail on an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. For the most part, during the Survey period, the
courts of appeals continued to hold that typical employment disputes be-
tween employers and employees do not raise issues of outrageous con-
duct and have generally ruled in favor of defendants on intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims.
For example, in Henderson v. Wellmann,27 5 the plaintiff sued a co-
worker for intentional infliction of emotional distress after the co-worker
lodged complaints of sexual harassment that resulted in termination of
the plaintiff. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded $70,000
in damages on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.2 76
The Houston Court of Appeals (1st District) reversed judgment on the
jury's verdict holding that the co-worker's complaints of sexual harass-
ment, even if they were false, were not sufficiently outrageous conduct
that would support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
269. Id. at *9.
270. Id. at *13.
271. 48 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001).
272. Id. at 753.
273. Id. at 759.
274. 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999).
275. 43 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
276. Id. at 596-97.
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tress.277 Moreover, the fact that the co-worker attended the plaintiff's
church one week after he was fired and sat in the pew in front of the
plaintiff and his wife did not amount to extreme and outrageous
conduct.278
Similarly, in Rescar, Inc. v. Ward,279 the Houston Court of Appeals (1st
District) held that threats to "blackball" the plaintiff from the railroad
tank car repair industry did not amount to extreme and outrageous con-
duct.280 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court awarding damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.281
A court of appeals upheld judgment in favor of the plaintiff on an in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress claim only once during the Sur-
vey period. In Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Sears,282 the Waco
Court of Appeals, recognized that ordinary employment disputes nor-
mally do not raise issues of outrageous conduct, but found that a com-
pany's attempt to have several federal agencies, including the IRS,
involved in an investigation of an employee was outrageous conduct.
2 83
Furthermore, the fact that the company attempted to have the plaintiff's
insurance license revoked after he was terminated amounted to post-ter-
mination conduct that was motivated by nothing more than a desire to
punish the employee. 284
The Bradford case, although not an employment case, makes it clear
that an employer is unlikely to be held liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress if it is simply exercising its legal rights. The Sears case,
on the other hand, demonstrates that courts will uphold jury verdicts for
intentional infliction of emotional distress if it appears that an employer
desires to punish the employee. Given the Texas Supreme Court's opin-
ions in GTE Bradford, courts will continue to struggle with facts and evi-
dence that lie between the two extremes.
C. DEFAMATION
Defamation is one area of the law that an employee will turn to in the
absence of other common law claims against an employer. In some in-
stances an employer may, in the course of an investigation against an em-
ployee, say something false or portray an employee in an unflattering
277. Id. at 597.
278. Id.
279. 60 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
280. Id. at 180. Moreover, on the issue of whether the plaintiff suffered sufficient emo-
tional distress to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the court ruled that the evidence did not support a finding that the emotional distress
suffered by the plaintiff was "severe," even if the plaintiff may have suffered serious emo-
tional distress. Id. at 179-81.
281. Id. at 184.
282. 54 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. granted).




way. This occurred in Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman.2 8 5
In Goodman, the plaintiff/employee prevailed at trial on her defama-
tion claim when she presented evidence that the store manager made mis-
statements of his relationship with the plaintiff during an investigation
following an altercation between the plaintiff and another employee. Al-
legedly, the store manager told an investigator for the defendant that he
had hugged and kissed the plaintiff on four and five occasions, that he
had given the plaintiff a back rub, and that there had been "heavy pet-
ting" between them.286 While an employer normally has a qualified privi-
lege that attaches to communications made during an investigation, the
privilege can be defeated if there is proof that the manager uttered the
slanderous words with actual malice. In this particular case, there was
evidence that the manager made the slanderous statements with knowl-
edge of their falsity or with reckless disregard to the truth.2 87 Thus, the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the privilege that normally at-
taches to statements made in an investigation was lost when the manager
knowingly made false statements.2 88
The Goodman case presents an interesting phenomenon concerning
corporate liability for defamation. That is, the court was willing to find
the employer liable for the false statements of its store manager in the
absence of any evidence that senior management condoned or ratified
the manager's conduct. In finding Minyard liable for the statements of
the store manager, the court relied on two well-established concepts of
defamation law. First, the court ruled that an employer can be held liable
for an employee's slanderous remarks if the employee is found to have
uttered the remarks while in the course and scope of employment. 289
Second, the qualified privilege that attaches to statements that are made
during the employer's investigation can be lost if the evidence shows that
the defendant uttered the slanderous statement with knowledge of its fal-
sity or reckless disregard for its truth.2 90
In this case, the court did not address whether high-level management
of the company was aware of the falsity of the statements. It is a harsh
result to take away the company's qualified privilege for false statements
made by the store manager during an investigation, even if the statements
made were false. It would be more just to require the plaintiff to intro-
duce evidence that high-level managers were either aware of the falsity of
the statements or that they consciously disregarded the truth before tak-
ing away the employer's qualified privilege.
With respect to privilege, one court held that consent to publication of
allegedly defamatory statements was a defense in a defamation case. In
285. 50 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. granted).
286. Id. at 138.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 140.
289. Id. at 138.
290. Minyard, 50 S.W.3d at 140.
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Rouch v. Continental Airlines, Inc. ,291 the plaintiff was dismissed by Con-
tinental Airlines after it was discovered that she had violated company
policy by charging a fee to customers for notarizing documents. Follow-
ing her termination, she appealed her discharge through the employer's
internal grievance procedure. 292 The plaintiff complained that her co-em-
ployees had slandered her during internal appeal hearings. Following a
jury trial, the trial court granted Continental's motion for judgment non
obstante veredicto on grounds that the plaintiff had consented to the de-
famatory statements when she appealed her termination. The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's j.n.o.v. in favor of the employer, hold-
ing that a party who submits his or her conduct to an investigation, know-
ing that the results of the investigation will be published, consents to that
publication. 293 The court also held that by challenging her termination
and requesting reinstatement through the company's appeals procedure,
the employee submitted her conduct to investigation and review and con-
sented to the results of the investigation being published at the
hearing.294
Similarly, in Henderson v. Wellman,295 the Houston Court of Appeals
(1st District) held that alleged defamatory statements made at an arbitra-
tion hearing were absolutely privileged. If the statements had been made
in court they would have been privileged. Because arbitration is a judi-
cial or quasi judicial proceeding, statements made during arbitration are
also privileged. 296
D. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
Because an employee has no cause of action for wrongful termination
in the absence of a written contract that abrogates the at-will doctrine,
the employee will sometimes assert causes of action for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel against his former employer.
For example, in Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc.,297 the plaintiff alleged
that his employer had failed to inform him of its accounting problems
when it recruited him to come to work at Segue Software. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that in order to have actionable fraud for fail-
ure to disclose there must be a duty to disclose. 298 The court found Segue
Software had no duty to disclose its accounting problems to potential em-
ployees and, therefore, had not committed fraud.299
In Sonnichsen v. Baylor University,300 the plaintiff, the head coach for
291. 70 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
292. Id. at 171.
293. Id. at 172 (citing on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d (1976)).
294. Id. at *8.
295. 43 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001).
296. Id. at 600.
297. 232 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2000).
298. Id. at 481.
299. Id.
300. 47 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet. h.).
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the Baylor University women's volleyball team, sued for breach of con-
tract and fraud following his termination of employment. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the breach of contract
claim. On appeal the plaintiff argued that his counter defense of promis-
sory estoppel raised a material issue of fact on his breach of contract
claim.30 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Baylor University orally
promised to give a two-year written contract to all head coaches that
were under a one-year oral contract. The defendant countered that the
statute of frauds made unenforceable any oral promise of employment
over one year.302
The Waco Court of Appeals held that, in order for promissory estoppel
to be available as a defense to the statute of frauds where there is an oral
promise to sign an agreement, the agreement that is the subject of the
oral promise must comply with the statute of frauds at the time the oral
promise to sign is made. 30 3 Because there was no writing encompassing a
two year contract that was in existence at the time the representation was
made, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer.304
E. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court did not decide an
employment case involving tortious interference. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Sturges,305 however, the Texas Supreme Court made rulings that will
inevitably affect employment cases.
In Sturges, the plaintiffs contracted to purchase vacant commercial
property in Nederland, Texas. The plaintiff intended for a Fleming Food
grocery store to be built on the property. In order to satisfy the size re-
quirements of the grocery store, the plaintiffs sought to modify size re-
strictions that Wal-Mart and others had previously placed on the property
and an adjacent property. When Sturges contacted Wal-Mart to request
modification of the size restrictions, a manager in Wal-Mart's property
management department indicated to Sturges that the company would
approve his request.306 At the same time, however, another Wal-Mart
manager in another department was evaluating the possibility of building
a Wal-Mart store on the property. When the other Wal-Mart manager
learned that Sturges was planning to purchase the land and lease to Flem-
ing Foods for a grocery store, the manager suggested to the other Wal-
Mart manager that Wal-Mart could thwart Sturges' effort to purchase the
property by refusing to approve the requested modifications. 30 7 Because
Wal-Mart would not modify the size restrictions, Fleming Foods cancelled
its letter of intent with Sturges, and the deal to purchase the land fell
301. Id. at 124.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 126.
304. Id.
305. 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001).
306. Id. at 714.
307. Id.
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through. 308
Sturges and his business partners sued Wal-Mart for tortious interfer-
ence with their prospective lease with Fleming Foods. The interference
alleged was Wal-Mart's unreasonable refusal to approve the requested
site plan modifications.309 On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court seemed
to struggle with precisely what conduct is lawful and unlawful in a cause
of action for interference with prospective contractual or business rela-
tions. Recognizing that there is a fine line between lawful and fair com-
petition and unlawful acts that interfere with legitimate business
relations, the court held that to recover for tortious interference with a
prospective business relation, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
conduct was independently tortious or wrongful. 310 Conduct that is
merely "sharp" or "unfair" is not actionable and cannot be the basis for
tortious interference with prospective relations.311 Therefore, the court
reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning that there was
no evidence that Wal-Mart's actions were unlawful. 312
The Sturges opinion will undoubtedly put the brakes on many cases of
tortious interference with prospective business relations. A plaintiff must
now assert an independent wrongful act by the defendant in order to
state a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations.
It is not enough to allege that a defendant acted unfairly or that a defen-
dant intended to interfere even if its acts are lawful. Rather, the defen-
dant must commit an independent act that would itself be unlawful or
tortious in order to have a claim for tortious interference. 31 3
F. NEGLIGENCE BASED CLAIMS
Employees sometimes allege causes of action against their employer
based on the employer's negligence. During the Survey period, there
were a number of cases in which employees were able to recover from
their former employers on the basis of negligence.
For example, in Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Co.'s v. Sears,314 the em-
ployee recovered a judgment against his former employer on the basis of
a negligent investigation following complaints that the plaintiff and others
were receiving kickbacks on bids for repairs for property damage. When
the company received complaints of kickbacks, it hired an out-of-state
investigator, who was aided in his investigation by one of the company's
internal auditors.315 Eventually, several of the people involved in the al-
leged kickback scheme were indicted for mail fraud. The plaintiff, how-
ever, was not among those indicted. Nonetheless, the plaintiff was
308. Id.
309. Id. at 715-16.
310. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d at 726.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 728.
313. See Sturges, 52 S.W.3d at 726.
314. 54 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. granted).
315. Id. at 365.
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terminated for allegedly being involved in the kickback scheme.316
The plaintiff brought a cause of action against his former employer for,
among other things, negligence. The plaintiff alleged that the company
had negligently investigated the complaints of the kickback scheme.3 7
Recognizing that an employer does not owe an employee a duty of good
faith and fair dealing,318 the Waco Court of Appeals nonetheless held
that an employer owes its employees a duty to use reasonable care in
conducting an internal investigation.319
Although the court of appeals held that an employer does owe its em-
ployees a duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting an investigation,
the court reasoned that the evidence did not support the jury's finding
that the company's investigation fell below the level of an ordinarily pru-
dent investigation. Accordingly, the court of appeals set aside and re-
versed the judgment on the claim for negligent investigation. 320
In another negligence case, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that
an employer can be liable for conducting a negligent drug screening test.
In Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon,321 an employee sued his
former employer complaining that it negligently conducted the collection
of his urine specimen during a mandatory drug test.322 The court consid-
ered whether an employer owes a duty of care to its employees in con-
ducting drug screening tests. The court held that the employer does owe
its employees a duty to use reasonable care in collection urine samples
for drug testing.323
In addition to negligence claims brought by employees, many employ-
ers confront claims from customers or third parties for the negligence of
its employees. In most instances, the controlling question of law is
whether the company had a unique duty to the third party to control its
employee or whether the employee was acting within the course and
scope of his or her employment. That was the issue in the Ana, Inc. v.
Lowry. 324
In Lowry, an employee of the defendant attacked and chased the plain-
tiff out of the company store after the plaintiff went into the store to buy
a jar of mayonnaise. After the plaintiff complained to the employee that
the prices were too high, the employee became verbally abusive, chased
the plaintiff out of the store, and kicked her car.325 At issue were the
extent of the employee's actions, whether his actions were within the
course and scope of his employment, and whether he acted as a vice prin-
cipal of the company. The court held that there was no evidence that the
316. Id. at 366.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 367.
319. Sears, 54 S.W.3d at 367.
320. Id. at 372.
321. 37 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. granted).
322. Id. at 984.
323. Id. at 488.
324. 31 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
325. Id. at 768.
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clerk was exercising his duties as an employee when he chased the plain-
tiff out of the store and, therefore, he was not acting within the course
and scope of his employment.326 In addition, the fact that the clerk was
apparently in charge of the store at the time of the altercation was not
enough evidence to show that he acting as a vice principal of the com-
pany, thereby negating liability on that basis as well. 327
In Wise v. Complete Staffing Services, Inc.,328 an employee was injured
when she was attacked by a temporary employee hired by the employer
and supplied by a temporary employment agency.329 The employee sued
her employer and the temporary employment agency, arguing that they
each had a duty to investigate the background of her attacker before he
was hired. In addition, the plaintiff argued that, even if the employer had
no duty to investigate, it owed a duty to conduct the limited investigation
it had in fact conducted with reasonable care.330
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that neither the staffing agency
nor the employer had a duty to the plaintiff to conduct a background
check on the temporary employee unless a background check is "directly
related to the duties of the job at hand. ''331 Because the temporary em-
ployment agency undertook a limited background check, however, the
court found that the agency must undertake that duty with reasonable
care.332 Accordingly, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of
the employment agency on the plaintiff's claim of negligent background
investigation. 333
In Lee Lewis Construction, Inc. v. Harrison,334 the Texas Supreme
Court held that a general contractor can be liable for the negligence of its
subcontractor's employees if the general contractor retains control over
safety operations on a construction site.335 In this case, the family of an
employee of a glass subcontractor sued the general contractor of the con-
struction site after the employee fell ten stories and died. The plaintiffs
alleged that the general contractor failed to require the employee to wear
a safety harness even though it required its own employees to wear a
safety harness at all times.336 The employer argued that the glass subcon-
tractor retained full control over the safety of its own employees. 337
In a seemingly straight-forward opinion, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the general contractor could be liable for the wrongful death of an
employee of its subcontractors when it was aware that the subcontractor's
326. Id. at 770-71.
327. Id. at 771.
328. 56 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet. h.).
329. Id. at 901.
330. Id. at 901-02.
331. Id. at 903.
332. Id. at 904.
333. Wise, 56 S.W.3d at 904.
334. No. 99-0793, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 132 (Tex. Dec. 20, 2001).
335. Id. at *2.
336. Id. at *10-11.
337. Id. at *5.
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employees were working under unsafe conditions and that it was against
the general contractor's policies to allow its own employees to work
under such conditions.338 In a rather lengthy concurring opinion, how-
ever, Justice Hecht implored the full Texas Supreme Court to revisit the
entire issue of what duty a general contractor owes to a subcontractor's
employees. Justice Hecht argued that, while evidence that the general
contractor retained control over job safety is necessary, it is not sufficient
to hold the general contractor liable for the death of the independent
contractor's employee. 339
Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Owen, noted several justifications for
why a general contractor should not be liable for injuries suffered by a
subcontractor's employees. Most notably, Justice Hecht observed that a
general contractor's liability is inconsistent with the workers' compensa-
tion system and the general nature of the relationship between an inde-
pendent contractor and the general contractor. 340 A general contractor
who hires an independent subcontractor includes in its contract costs the
cost of its subcontractor's expense of providing workers' compensation
coverage. Consequently, imposing liability on the general contractor who
ultimately bears the cost of workers' compensation insurance is inconsis-
tent with the idea that workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive
remedy. 341
Justice Hecht observed that the general contractor should not be ex-
posed to increased liability when the subcontractor is in a better position
to police the safety of its employees.342 In addition, the worker should
not have greater rights as an employee of an independent contractor than
he would as an employee of a general contractor. 343
Finally, Justice Hecht noted that the general contractor could not
"fairly share" its duty of job safety with the subcontractor because the
general contractor is not closely associated with the subcontractor's em-
ployees. The subcontractor retains more control of its own employees.
Therefore, holding the general contractor liable for the injuries of its sub-
contractor's employees would make it the "virtual insurer" of the work-
place, a phenomenon that Justice Hecht states is a "revolution in
liability. '344 Moreover, Justice Hecht notes a certain irony to holding a
general contractor liable for injuries to its subcontractor's workers. Be-
cause the general contractor is only liable in those situations where it
retains control over safety, a general contractor can escape liability if it
delegates safety-matters to its subcontractors. This creates a "perverse"
rule in the words of Justice Hecht. 345
338. Id. at *9.
339. Harrison, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 132, at *56-57 (Hecht, J., concurring).
340. Id. at *44.
341. Id. at *44-45.
342. Id. at *45-46.
343. Id. at *46.
344. Harrison, 2000 Tex. LEXIS 132, at *47.
345. Id. at *48.
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G. SABINE PILOT
Presently, the only common law exception to the doctrine of employ-
ment-at-will in Texas is the Sabine Pilot exception, named after the semi-
nal case of Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck.346 In past years,
employees have tried without success to expand the common law excep-
tions beyond Sabine Pilot, only to have their efforts rebuffed by the ap-
pellate courts. During the Survey period there were a number of
important decisions that reinforced this rule and two that expounded on
the boundaries of the exception.
Perhaps the most notable of the Sabine Pilot cases decided in the Sur-
vey period is Simmons Airlines v. Lagrotte.347 In Lagrotte, the plaintiff,
an employee of Simmons Airlines, was terminated after he refused to fly
a plane that he claimed was encountering severe icing conditions. 348 The
plaintiff was a member of the pilot's union and, therefore, was subject to
a collective bargaining agreement. 349 Although he initially filed a griev-
ance to challenge his termination, the plaintiff eventually withdrew his
grievance and filed a lawsuit for wrongful termination, alleging that he
had been terminated for refusing to perform illegal acts.350 The plaintiff
claimed that the illegal acts would have subjected him to criminal penal-
ties and was thus within the exception of the at-will doctrine announced
in Sabine Pilot.351
The Dallas Courts of Appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, holding that because he was subject to the collective bargaining
agreement, which provided that pilots could not be disciplined or dis-
charged without just cause, the Sabine Pilot exception did not apply.352
The court reasoned that Sabine Pilot is to be narrowly construed only in
cases where the employee is employed at-will. The plaintiff in Lagrotte
was not an at-will employee. The court of appeals refused to extend the
Sabine Pilot exception because, as an intermediate appellate court, it is
bound by stare decisis and must follow the law as declared by the Texas
Supreme Court.353 In addition, the court noted that a "for cause" em-
ployee did not need the remedy afforded by Sabine Pilot because his rem-
edy lies with the collective bargaining agreement. 354
In two other cases, the courts of appeals were not so kind to the em-
ployer. In Hawthorne v. Star Enterprise, Inc.,355 the employer adopted a
policy that required employees to physically smell stripped water samples
346. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
347. 50 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. filed).
348. Id. at 750.
349. Indeed, the court noted that the plaintiff had filed a grievance with the pilot's
union challenging his termination but that he later withdrew his grievance in favor of seek-
ing damages in court. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 750-51.
352. Lagrotte, 50 S.W.3d at 753.
353. Id. at 752-53.
354. Id. at 753.
355. 45 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).
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to determine whether hazardous chemicals had been removed.356 The
plaintiff refused to smell the water and reported the company's require-
ment to the Occupational Safety & Health Administration ("OSHA"). A
short time later, the plaintiff was discharged. In his deposition, the plain-
tiff testified several times that he was fired for reporting the company to
OSHA.3
57
Armed with the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment arguing that the sole cause for the plaintiff's termination
was the plaintiff's report to OSHA, thereby negating Sabine Pilot's illegal
act requirement. 358 The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed the sum-
mary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that reporting the em-
ployer's illegal requirement and actually performing the illegal act could
not be separated. The plaintiff's report to OSHA was not a new and
separate act for which he was fired; rather, it was simply a continuation of
his refusal to perform the illegal act. 359 The fact that the plaintiff reported
the employer's conduct to a federal agency in order to get the conduct
stopped did not preclude him from asserting a Sabine Pilot claim.360
In Rescar, Inc. v. James Ward,361 the plaintiff sued his employer for
wrongful termination when he was discharged shortly after he wrote a
letter to the president of the company describing several violations of
state and federal environmental protection laws at the defendant's Or-
ange County facility. In his letter, the plaintiff asked that the company
stop its "lawless" behavior and he offered solutions to clean up the viola-
tions.362 Moreover, because he was plant manager of the Orange County
facility, the plaintiff felt he was individually responsible for the defen-
dant's violations. In addition to bringing a Sabine Pilot claim, the plaintiff
asserted a TCHRA claim alleging that he was terminated in retaliation
for protesting the company's professed policy of refusing to hire too
many minority employees. 363 On appeal, the defendant/employer argued
that the Sabine Pilot claim failed because he could not have been fired
both for the TCHRA illegal acts and the environmental illegal acts, as
these two claims together were inconsistent with Sabine Pilot's require-
ment of a sole reason for termination. 364 The Houston Court of Appeals
(1st District) rejected this argument, holding that requesting an employee
to perform two illegal acts does not bar the plaintiff from bringing a Sab-
ine Pilot claim. 365
356. Id. at 758.
357. Id. at 758-59.
358. Id. at 760.
359. Id. at 761.
360. Hawthorne, 45 S.W.3d at 762.
361. 60 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
362. Id. at 174.
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IV. NONCOMPETITION
In Friedman, Clark & Shapiro, Inc. v. Greenberg, Grant & Richards,
Inc. ,366 several former employees sought to avoid agreements not to com-
pete by contending that the noncompetition agreement was not ancillary
to or part of "an otherwise enforceable agreement. ' 367 The noncompeti-
tion agreement was part of an employment contract that stated "the em-
ployment of Employee shall continue so long as services rendered by
Employee are satisfactory to Employer. ' 368 The court determined that
this "satisfaction agreement" did modify the at-will nature of the employ-
ment relationship and constituted an otherwise enforceable agreement
capable of supporting the noncompetition agreement. 369
In Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Dupre,370 the issue was whether
certain promises in an otherwise at-will employment setting could serve
as an otherwise enforceable agreement. The employer alleged that it
promised to provide the former employee with training and access to con-
fidential information. The language in the contract, however, only stated
that the employer "may from time to time" provide such training.371 The
court held the promise to be illusory because of definite commitment by
the employer to provide the training. In addition, the court held that, by
the time the former employee signed the agreement, the employer had
already granted access to the confidential information; consequently, the
"past consideration" could not support the noncompetition agreement. 372
In Butler v. Arrow Mirror & Glass, Inc.,373 the court had to decide
whether a certain territorial restraint was a reasonable restriction. As to
the geographic limitation, the court noted that the "breadth of enforce-
ment of territorial restraints ... depends upon the nature and extent of
the employer's business and the degree of the employee's involve-
ment. '374 In this case the court of appeals held that the trial court prop-
erly reformed a geographic restriction to include only the two counties
where the former employee had worked.37 5
366. No. 14-99-01218-CV, 2001 WL 1136169 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 27,
2001, pet. filed) (unpublished opinion). See also Stone v. Griffin Communications & Se-
curity Sys., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, no pet. h.) (holding that a
satisfaction employment agreement was an otherwise enforceable agreement capable of
supporting a covenant not to compete).
367. Friedman, 2001 WL 1136169, at *2; TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 15.50(a) (Vernon
2001).
368. Id. at *3.
369. Id. at *4.
370. No. 14-99-01338-CV, 2001 WL 1013834 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 6,
2001, no pet. h.) (unpublished opinion). See also Bandit Messenger of Austin, Inc. v. Con-
treras, No. 03-00-00359-CV, 2000 WL 1587664, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (no
evidence of enforceable promise to provide access to trade secrets).
371. See Dupre, 2001 WL 1013834, at *2.
372. Id.
373. 51 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
374. Id. at 753.




In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,376 the Supreme Court held that
the American Arbitration Act ("AAA") 377 applied to arbitration agree-
ments contained in employment contracts. Circuit City implemented a
mandatory arbitration policy and required that all employees agree to
binding arbitration as the exclusive means for resolving employment dis-
putes. Even though he signed an arbitration agreement, Adams filed a
lawsuit against the company in state court. Circuit City filed a suit in
federal court to enjoin Adams' state court action.378 Adams argued to
the Supreme Court that text of the AAA excluded contracts of employ-
ment for any "class of worker engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce. '379 The Supreme Court rejected this broad interpretation with a
narrow construction-resulting in all arbitration agreements in employ-
ment contracts (except for the limited class of workers engaged in the
movement of goods, etc.) falling within the scope of the AAA. 380 In ad-
dition, the Court reiterated that the AAA preempts any state law limiting
the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 38'
As a result of Circuit City, the battleground for the enforceability of
arbitration agreements will now focus on contract formation under state
law. Although the AAA applies to employment contracts, any court,
whether federal or state, must first determine that a valid agreement
exists.
In Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,382 the court looked to Texas law
establishing that "contracts which are unconscionable are invalid and un-
enforceable. '383 When a group of plaintiffs sought to avoid an arbitra-
tion agreement, the court held that because the plaintiffs did not speak
English and no one translated the agreements for the plaintiffs, the arbi-
tration agreements were "procedurally unconscionable. '384 In a similar
case, Prevost v. Burns International Security Services Corp.,385 the court
refused to enforce an arbitration agreement, as a matter of law, in which
the parties disputed whether the employee ever signed the agreement. 386
Instead, the court determined that a jury trial was needed to resolve the
signature issue. 387
Employers often include an arbitration agreement in an employment
376. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
377. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (2001).
378. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 1306.
379. Id. at 1304.
380. Id. at 1308-11.
381. Id.
382. 133 F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
383. Id. at 940.
384. Id. at 940-41.
385. 126 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
386. Id. at 442.
387. Id. at 442. The court also warned the parties and counsel of the penalty of perjury
in the event further investigation revealed that the plaintiff either did or did not sign the'
agreement.
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application or employee handbook. In J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster,388
the court concluded that an arbitration agreement was illusory and thus
unenforceable when an employer retained the right to abolish or modify
any employment policy without prior notice. 389 According to the court,
when an employer reserves the right to modify a policy at-will or by in-
cluding the policy in a document the employer disavows as not being a
contract, the employer is not bound and any promise made under those
conditions is illusory.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that federal courts must not sec-
ond-guess an arbitrator's decision once a dispute is submitted to arbitra-
tion. In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. UMWA, 390 the issue was
whether an arbitrator's decision that an employer did not have "just
cause" to remove a truck driver who twice tested positive for marijuana
violated public policy.391 The employer filed suit to set aside the arbitra-
tor's decision as contrary to public policy. The court held that it would
not substitute "general considerations of supposed public interests" for
the arbitrator's decision.392 Only when a public policy is "explicit" or
"dominant" should a federal court set aside an arbitrator's ruling.393
Along similar lines, the Supreme Court held in Major League Baseball
Player's Ass'n v. Garvey394 that, even if an arbitrator makes incorrect fac-
tual findings, the arbitrator's award should not be overturned. Unless the
arbitrator dispenses "his own brand of industrial justice," a court should
not intervene. 395 In Garvey, a former major league player, Steve Garvey,
submitted a claim for damages he allegedly suffered as a result of the
collusion against free agents by the Major League. After the claim was
denied, the dispute proceeded to binding arbitration. At issue in the arbi-
tration proceeding was whether the San Diego Padres had ever offered
Garvey a contract extension. The arbitrator ignored the terms of a letter
signed by the San Diego Padres' President purporting to be a contract
extension. The arbitrator denied Garvey's claim because of the lack of
evidence to support his claim that he was not offered a contract extension
due to collusion. Garvey filed suit in federal court seeking to set aside
the arbitrator's decision.396 The Court held that a federal court's disa-
greement with an arbitrator's findings, particularly credibility assess-
ments, is not a sufficient basis to overturn the arbitrator's decision.
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. and Garner do not mean, however, that
parties have no appellate remedies. In Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook,397
the parties included in the arbitration agreement an appellate procedure
388. 49 S.W.3d 507, 514 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed).
389. Id. at 514.
390. 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
391. Id. at 59.
392. Id. at 62.
393. Id. at 67.
394. 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
395. Id. at 509.
396. Id. at 506-08.
397. 254 F.3d 588, 595 (5th Cir. 2001).
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and specified that "the standard of review to be applied to the arbitrator's
findings of fact and conclusions of law will be the same as that applied by
an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a
jury. '398 After the plaintiff won an arbitration award, the company
sought to have the award vacated, applying the standard of review speci-
fied in the contract. 399 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's reversal
of the arbitrator's decision, using the standard of review to which the par-
ties had agreed.400
In Kaufman v. Provost Umphrey Law Firm L.L.P.,40 the plaintiff
worked as a non-equity partner in a law firm. The plaintiff sued the firm
and its equity partners alleging that the partnership had breached a con-
tract, breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff, and violated Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act. The law firm filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration. The plaintiff had already instituted arbitration concerning certain
claims that arose under various partnership agreements. The plaintiff,
however, contended that the claims that she had filed in federal court
were outside of any arbitration agreement. Thus, the issue for the court
was whether plaintiff's claims were within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. 402
The primary area of dispute was the text of the arbitration agreement.
The arbitration clause stated that "the equity partners and non-equity
partners shall make a good faith effort to settle any dispute or claim aris-
ing under this partnership agreement. '40 3 The court noted that there is a
strong Federal policy in favor of arbitration; however, the court cited
Fifth Circuit precedent distinguishing between "narrow" and "broad" ar-
bitration clauses.404 The law firm contended that the arbitration clause
was broad and that the words "any dispute" should be interpreted to in-
clude all of plaintiff's causes of action. The court, however, did not ac-
cept that interpretation. Instead, the court found that the words "any
dispute" were limited to only disputes arising under the partnership
agreement. 40 5 Because plaintiff had signed two partnership agreements
that did not contain an arbitration clause, the court held that claims aris-
ing under those agreements were not within the scope of another con-
tract's arbitration provision.40 6 Further, the alleged conduct occurred at
times when no arbitration agreement was in effect; consequently, the
court held that those events were not required to be submitted to
arbitration.407
398. Id. at 590.
399. Id. at 592.
400. Id. at 595.
401. 161 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Tex 2001).
402. Id. at 724.
403. Id. at 725.
404. Id. (citing Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore Corp v. Coastal Carriers Corp., 981 F.
Supp. 752, 754 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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The court rejected the law firm's contention that the integration or
merger clause of the subsequent partnership agreement, which contained
the arbitration provision, restated and superceded the prior partnership
agreements. The court noted that the purpose of an integration clause is
to "trigger the parole evidence rule which precludes the enforcement of
inconsistent or prior agreements in a finalized contract. '40 8 The court
rejected the law firm's argument that the integration clause swept all of
plaintiff's claims into arbitration. The court determined that, because the
conduct that had served as the basis of the alleged prior breaches were
made at a time when the parties did not intend to be bound by an arbitra-
tion agreement, the integration clause was ineffective to cover those
claims.40 9 Based on its survey, the court noted that courts of other juris-
dictions "focus on the fact that a run of the mill" integration clause dose
not take away a party's right to litigate under prior contract; rather, the
purpose of an integration clause is to prevent prior unincorporated agree-
ments from being enforced in the final contract. 410
The court also considered whether the plaintiff's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty fell within the scope of the arbitration clause. In con-
ducting its analysis, the court focused on the allegations in the complaint,
not the characterization of the cause of action. In particular, the court
held that claims "arising under this partnership agreement" were not lim-
ited to breach of contract claims.411 The appropriate test to apply is
whether the tort is "so interwoven with the contract that it could not
stand alone. ' 412 The plaintiff argued that her breach of fiduciary duty
claim was not interwoven with the partnership agreement because she
was asserting a "common law" breach of fiduciary claim instead of one
based on contract.413 Because the factual allegations made in plaintiff's
complaint show that the claim was based on a breach of contract, the
court concluded that her breach of fiduciary duty claims must be arbi-
trated.414 The court then considered whether the plaintiff's statutory dis-
crimination cause of action fell within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. The court concluded that the statutory discrimination claims
could be maintained independently of any partnership agreement; there-
fore, the claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. 415
The court rejected defendant's view that existing Fifth Circuit precedent
required the claims to be arbitrated. 416
408. Id. at 728 (citing Hubcek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30, 31
(1958)).
409. Kaufman, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
410. Id. at 729.
411. Id. at 730.
412. Id. (citing Ford v. NYL Care Health Plans of Gulf Coast, 141 F.3d 243, 250 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)).
413. Id.
414. Kaufman, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 731-32.
415. Id. at 736-37.
416. Id. at 732-33. Defendants cited several 5th Circuit cases where the court had held




In the next Survey Period, practitioners should expect courts to con-
tinue struggling with Reeves and the determination of whether sufficient
evidence of discrimination exists to allow cases to be decided by juries.
The perception that Reeves and Quantum Chemical will result in more
discrimination cases being decided by juries may also lead employers to
rely on Circuit City in implementing mandatory arbitration policies.
These decisions by the United States and Texas Supreme Courts, in con-
junction with the economic recession in 2001, set the table for an interest-
ing 2002 for employment law practitioners.
claims. See Mouton v. Metro. Life Ins., 147 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1998); Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc., 887 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1996).
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